Toxic Tort Litigation Blog : Toxic Tort Lawyer & Attorney : Epstein Becker Green Law Firm : Product Liability, Contamination, Pollution

There is a significant risk that there will be a resurgence of mold claims and mold litigation in the wake of Hurricane Sandy.  Sandy left behind thousands of homes and offices in New York and New Jersey with flood-soaked flooring and sheet rock and water-damaged carpeting and personal belongings, which are all potential sources of mold if not removed and replaced.  In addition to potential mold exposure to property owners and lessees, there is the potential occupational risk to the thousands of workers in the construction trades who are working to repair damaged homes and offices.

The most likely source of mold-related claims, however, will arise over disagreement concerning the scope of work of remediation contractors, construction companies and others involved in returning storm-ravaged communities to some semblance of normality.  The contractor who replaces ruined sheet rock walls or wooden flooring, for example, may not be thinking about the water-soaked floor joists that may be a breeding ground for mold. The contractor who rebuilds an HVAC system may not feel responsible for sources of mold that may be spreading via that system.

Although certain affected surfaces may appear to recovered after being submerged under storm water for days, those surfaces may in fact be a breeding ground for mold. As much as possible, a building contractor should clarify with the client in writing what responsibility, if any, the building contractor has for addressing mold conditions, particularly those conditions that may be adjacent to area of new construction.

On November 30, 2012, WNYC broadcast a highly informative program on the Leonard Lopate Show titled, "Mold: Please Explain", which can be downloaded from WNYC's website. The guests on the program were Monona Rossol, an expert in environmental health and industrial hygeine, and Chin Yang, a microbiologist with Prestige EnviroMicrobiology. Ms. Rossol and Mr. Chin discussed what mold is, where it comes from, how it grows, what it can do to your home and health, and how to get rid of it.  The listener Q&A following the initial presentation made clear that there are widespread misperceptions about mold and how to address it.   

Thankfully, there are many publicly available websites that provide first-rate information concerning mold hazards and how to address it.  These sources should be the first place anyone with a mold concern should look for answers.  They are also excellent sources of information for toxic tort practitioners defending mold cases, who need to identify relevant regulations and standards of practice in the industry.  These sources also provide valuable insights into how to protect human health during the restoration process.

These sources, most of which are provided on the WNYC website, include NYC's excellent site at: The NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; EPA's "Mold Regulation in Schools and Commercial Buildings", EPA's "A Brief Guide to Mold, Moisture, and Your Home", "Flood Cleanup: Avoiding Indoor Air Quality Problems" and "The Inside Story: A Guide to Indoor Air Quality" "An Introduction to Indoor Air Quality", FEMA's "Dealing With Mold and MIldew in Your Floor Damaged Home" and "Eradicating Mold and Mildew" HUD's "Healthy Homes Programs Resources" and Disaster Recovery: Mold Removal Guidelines for Your Flooded Home" and lastly, the "Guidance for Clinicians on the Recognition and Management of Health Effects related to Mold Exposure and Moisture Indoors", published by the University of Connecticut Health Center, Division of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Center for Indoor Environments and Health.

There is no dearth of strong science-based resources concerning mold and mold rememdiation on the internet. Unfortunately, these resources are often consulted only after some ill-advised action is taken with regard to a mold concern, not before. 

Guest Blogger Nicolas S. Allison  is an Associate in Epstein Becker & Green's Asbestos Group in New York. A graduate of Princeton University and Boston University Law School, in addition to his mass tort asbestos work, Nick also represents firm clients in a wide variety of industries, including financial institutions, health care providers and health care insurers.  He also defends environmental claims brought under the New York State Navigation Law.  In discussing the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp, Nick and I examine the reasoning of  the majority opinon, the concurring opinion and the concurring/dissenting opinion and how the justices address plaintiff's failure to warn and design defect claims in light of the preemption under the Locomotive Inspection Act . 

On February 29, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a preemption decision in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Production Corp, an asbestos product liability case. The case is noteworthy for product liability and toxic tort practitioners because of the Court's split analysis concerning the potential preemptive effect of federal legislation on failure to warn claims.

Plaintiff's decedent, George Corson, was a machinist for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad. As a machinist, his duties included the removal and replacement of asbestos-containing brake shoes and insulation on the company’s locomotives. In 2005,  Corson was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, after which Corson sued several dozen manufacturers, including  part suppliers of the railroad company's locomotives. The trial court granted summary judgment to the railroad supplier defendants on preemption grounds and the Third Circuit affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether federal preemption should result in dismissal not just of the design defect claim, but to the failure to warn claim as well 

Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice Thomas summarily rejected Plaintiff’s argument that, as a distinct cause of action, her failure to warn claim was not preempted by federal law. Thomas reasoned that “the ‘gravamen’ of petitioners’ failure to warn claims ‘is still that [Corson] suffered harmful consequences as a result of his exposure to asbestos contained in the locomotive parts.” By summarily rejecting the argument and conflating failure to warn claims with defective design claims, Thomas does little to present a concrete roadmap for evaluating the preemptive effect of federal law involving product liability causes of action.

Dissenting in part and concurring in part, Justice Sotomayor more or less adopted plaintiff’s approach, drawing a distinction between failure to warn claims and design defect claims. Sotomayor reasoned that "a product may be flawlessly designed and still subject its manufacturer or seller to liability for lack of adequate instructions or warnings."  Despite  a scholarly analysis of product liability jurisprudence,  Sotomayor did not persuasively explain how the distinction precludes the preemptive effect of the federal legislation at issue. It is noteworthy that her analysis failed to persuade six other justices on the Court.  .

In practical terms, Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion possibly articulates the strongest underpinning of the majority opinion.  Her preemption analysis examined the broad regulatory authority granted under the Locomotive Inspection Act.  Kagan reasoned that “if an agency has the power to prohibit the use of locomotive equipment, it also has the power to condition the use of that equipment on proper warnings.” Under this reasoning, Kagan determined that because the agency could have required warnings about the equipment's use, the petitioner's failure to warn claim, no less than her defective design claims, was  preempted.  Thus, under Kagan’s preemptive analysis, regulatory silence has the same preemptive effect as explicit regulation.

This case represents an unusual application of field preemption--unusual because there is no indication that Congress intended to foreclose all state action concerning railroad safety rather than just the regulation of equipment used by the railroad.  Some commentators have sought to isolate the case from other preemption jurisprudence by arguing that the outcome of the case may have been different  if the Court did not feel bound by the precedent established in a 1926 Supreme Court case, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line. Still others have argued that the case represents an usual  departure for Justice Thomas, who generally narrowly construes the scope of  federal power over the states.

What is intruiging for product liability defense counsel is the idea, impliedly advanced by Justice Kagan, that warnings and instructions (the part of the product conveyed in print) should be treated as just another part of a product's design and not as the basis for an independent cause of action.  For the past several decades, plaintiffs have always had two bites at the apple--defectiive design and failure to warn. If the product was flawlessly designed, they could retreat to their warning claim.  If the product had terrific warnings, they could argue in the alternative that the poor design of the product could not be cured by strong warnings.  If this case is interpreted by future trial courts (in a non-preemption context) to mean that a failure to warn claim should be considered as part and parcel of a defective design claim, rather than a separate claim, manufacturers will have obtained an important precedent in Kurns.  Only time will tell.

In the case of Wyeth v. Weeks, the Alabama Supreme Court consented to answer the following question from the Middle District of Alabama: “Under Alabama law, may a drug company be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based on statements it made in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a brand-name drug, by plaintiffs claiming physical injury from a generic drug manufactured and distributed by a different company?" In its brief filed on December 12, 2011—a combined effort with the Alabama Defense Lawyers Association—the Defense Research Institute (DRI)  argues that well-established state tort duty principles prohibit imposing liability on a brand-name manufacturer that did not manufacture the product ingested by plaintiffs. The contrary decision of the Middle District of Alabama is one of but three decisions in the entire country that have allowed failure-to-warn claims to proceed against a brand-name manufacturer where the plaintiff ingested a generic version of the brand-name drug.

The dispute in this case stems from plaintiffs who ingested generic metoclopramide and developed tardive dyskinesia. The plaintiffs claimed that the generic manufacturer failed to warn of the dangers of metoclopramide adequately, and sued the generic defendant on a failure to warn theory. However, the United States Supreme Court recently ruled in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing that, because federal regulations prohibit generic manufacturers from unilaterally altering their warning labels, state tort failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers are preempted by federal law. Accordingly, the plaintiffs brought suit against the brand-name manufacturers, and the Middle District of Alabama denied in part the brand-name manufacturers’ motion to dismiss. DRI argues against extending common tort principles out of their shape to impose a duty on a defendant who did not manufacture the product and has no control over it. DRI maintains that federal preemption of generic manufacturers does not change this result, even if application of proper tort principles leaves the plaintiff without a remedy.

It would be bad jurisprudence and bad precedent for the Alabama Supreme Court to uphold plaintiffs' position and impose liability on a drug manufacturer, whose  product did not cause the alleged harm.  If that was the result, it is conceivable that a manufacturer with only 10% market share could be held strictly liable for adverse drug reactions caused by generic competitors, who might collectively control 90% of the market.  It would be unfair and unequitable to shift the burden of liability to a manufacturer whose product did not cause the injury merely because the Supreme Court has ruled that preemptioin protects generic manufacturers against state tort failure-to-warn claims. 

Sunovion Pharmaceuticals obtained summary judgment on October 5, 2011 after oral argument before the Hon. Stefan R. Underhill in federal court in Bridgeport, Connecticut in the case of Swoverland v. GlaxoSmithKline, 2011 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 127753.  Co-Defendant GlaxoSmithKline, represented by King & Spalding, also obtained summary judgment.  William A. Ruskin and Victoria Sloan of Epstein Becker & Green represented Sunovion. 

The plaintiff alleged that his use in combination of Sunovion’s Lunesta, a sleep aid, and GSK’s Paxil, an anti-depressant, caused depression and suicidal ideation, which resulted in an unsuccessful attempt to kill both himself and his daughter.  As a result of the incident, plaintiff was sentenced to prison and forfeited his position as a prison guard.  Sunovion defended the case on the basis that it adequately warned of the drug’s potential risks and that there was no causal connection between any alleged failure to warn and the treating physician’s prescription of the drug. 

In granting summary judgment to Sunovion, the court reaffirmed Connecticut’s adherence to the learned intermediary doctrine on the basis of the Connecticut Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Vitanza v. Upjohn, 257 Conn 365.   Judge Underhill described the learned intermediary doctrine as "essentially hold[ing] that because there is, or when there is a traditional physician/patient relationship, because the physician is the decision-maker as to whether a particular drug will be used by the ultimate consumer, it is the adequacy of the warnings to the physician that matter.  The Court also rejected plaintiff’s assertion that the learned intermediary doctrine should not apply in this case either because Lunesta directly advertised to the patient or over-promoted the product.  The Court held that there was no factual basis in the record to support the application of either of these exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine and that, as a matter of law, Connecticut did not recognize these exceptions.

Kenneth Ross, one of the more discerning authors in the product liability defense bar, has authored a thoughtful piece titled, Is There Anything Optional About Safety? in the August '09 DRI Product Liability Committee Newsletter--"Strictly Speaking".  As manufacturers design new products and update the design of old products, many times they sell and offer for sale differing levels of safety and quality.  Ken's article explores the legal and practical risks in selling products with these differences and provides advice to manufacturers about minimizing risk.  As one law professor notes, the case law is "muddled and quite sparse".  There are cases on both sides--those that hold that safety devices can be optional and those that hold that not installing a safety device establishes a basis for liability.  Ken discusses several important considerations that should be weighed in performing this delicate balancing act.

In a provocative thought piece appearing in the Wall Street Journal on March 9, 2009, L. Gordon Crovitz predicts that the United States Supreme Court decision in Wyeth v. Levine will usher in an era of increased prices for drug and create a disincentive for new product innovation. Mr. Crovitz compares the American legal culture behind the Court's decision to the Luddites that smashed mechanized looms in England at the beginning of the Industrial Age in 19th century England.  He also suggests that the decision's logic may lead product manufacturers to "carry 50 different warnings, one for each state, updated by local juries from time to time."  Despite his misgivings about the decision, it is not likely that any product manufacturers, drug makers or otherwise, are likely to start tailoring their warning on a state by state basis.  As a practical matter, products are sold nationally, often through distributors, and it would be virtually impossible to  ensure that product warnings for Texas purchasers ended up in Texas and that product warnings intended for California purchasers ended up in California.  Moreover, from a jury standpoint, nothing would please a plaintiff's lawyer more than to be able to argue that the manufacturer provided a less strict warning for the product in the jurisdiction where his client's accident occurred.