Toxic Tort Litigation Blog : Toxic Tort Lawyer & Attorney : Epstein Becker Green Law Firm : Product Liability, Contamination, Pollution

A Sixth Circuit case, Moeller v. Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC, 2011 U.S.App.Lexis 19987 (6^th Cir. Sept. 28, 2011), is the most recent in a series of judicial decisions that have rejected the opinions of plaintiffs’ experts in asbestos cases who espouse the “any exposure” or “any fiber” or “single fiber” theory of causation.  Pursuant to this specious line of reasoning, asbestos disease is a cumulative dose response process. Each and every exposure to asbestos during a person’s lifetime, no matter how small or trivial – even a single fiber – substantially contributes to the disease, whether it be asbestosis, lung cancer or mesothelioma. Using this theory of causation, plaintiffs have initiated a wave of new lawsuits against defendants far removed from the production of asbestos containing products.  As defense practitioners are well aware, successfully challenging weak causation expert opinions is key to winning any toxic exposure case, whether it involves asbestos or some other substance.

In a “must read” column in the New York Law Journal, dated October 19, 2011 titled "Courts Shoot Down Asbestos Causation Theory", Michael Hoenig, whose law firm defends asbestos case litigation, describes how plaintiff experts are promoting the “any fiber” or “any exposure” theory in courtrooms across the country and how a series of notable judicial decisions have begun to reject these theories as the underlying scientific methodology is subjected to scrutiny. In a recent amicus curiae brief filed by eleven distinguished scientists in a Pennsylvania asbestos case, none of whom received funding from or testified as experts for any of the parties in the case, the scientists attacked the methodological errors of the “any exposure” expert for:  (1) failing to consider the dose level of exposure and minimum threshold of asbestos fiber levels; (2) failing to consider the physical chemical and toxicological differences between various types of asbestos; (3) failing to distinguish between general causation and specific causation (and not even establishing general causation for chrysotile asbestos); (4) for suggesting that “every exposure” and “cumulative risk” theories are generally accepted when they are not; and (5) ignoring the large body of toxicological studies demonstrating that chrysotile asbestos is not potent as a cancer-causing agent. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed in Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts Co., 943 A.2d, 216, 223 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2007), that although it was “common for plaintiffs to submit expert affidavits attesting that any exposure to asbestos, no matter how minimal, is a substantial contributing factor in asbestos disease,” such opinions are not “not couched within accepted scientific methodology.”  The court called the “willingness on the part of some experts” to offer such opinions “one of the difficulties” courts face in the mass tort cases.

As the plaintiff bar continues to look further and further afield in its “endless search for a solvent bystander,” as one well-known plaintiff’s lawyer described the litigation, successful challenges under Daubert and Frye should only increase.  The author thanks Mr. Hoenig for his thoughtful treatment of this important topic.

From a risk management perspective, peripheral toxic tort defendants often decline to mount  Daubert challenges due to the cost and time involved and the uncertainty of the result, particularly when the plaintiff presents them with seemingly  reasonable settlement demands.  As a result, hundreds of peripheral defendants continue to be named in these cases and often pay their "penny in tribute" just to get out of the case.  Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions, judges responsible for large asbestos dockets are unwilling to give appropriate consideration to motions by "shade tree" defendants who might otherwise challenge plaintiffs' experts'  theories of causation.  Cynically, these judges know that the cases will most likely settle out if this type of motion is given short shrift.  There is little incentive for a peripheral defendant to risk an adverse  judgment at trial merely to earn the right to bring an appeal, no matter how strong the grounds may be.  Hopefully, cases like Moeller will have a trickle down effect and motivate the trial judges responsible for the asbestos dockets to re-think their approach. 

The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 ("CPSIA") provides that the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") will establish and maintain an Internet database on the safety of consumer products.  The CPSIA Section 212 requires that the database be: (1) available to the public; (2)  searchable; and (3) accessible on the CPSC's website.  Reports of harm caused by consumer products may be reported by consumers; local, state or federal govenment agencies; health care professionals; child service providers; and public safety entities. Ideally, the database will encourage the sharing of information and direct communications among consumers, consumer advocacy groups and state attorneys general, who have been given an important new role under the CPSIA.  For the first time, consumers will have direct instant access on the Agency's website to potentially important product safety information. 

The CPSIA of 2008 is much needed legislation to upgrade the level of  protection provided to the American consumer by the federal government.  The law represents the Congress' response to a year of multiple, embarrassing consumer product scandal after another during what some commentators have termed the "Year of the Recall".  In the past, information vital to the public welfare concerning defective consumer products has not been promptly provided to the American people.  At times, this delay may have been responsible for what may have been preventable injuries or deaths --  hence, the legislative mandate for the database.   

In light of these public benefits, can there be any dark side to this new era of governmental transparency?  Are consumer product companies justified in fearing that the database has the potential to  spread disinformation and unfairly tarnish reputations? 

The statute requires that a report submitted for inclusion on the database: (1) describe the consumer product; (2) identify the manufacturer or private labeler; (3) describe the harm related to the use of the product; (4) provide contact information; and (5) contain a verification that the report is true and accurate. Based upon informal Commission staffer comments, the CPSC is not required to perform an independent investigation to determine the veracity of a report or whether the incident that is the subject of the report occurred in the manner claimed or occurred at all.  For this reason, there is a risk that the database may morph into a  consumer Wikipedia, but with the imprimatur of United States approval and the gloss that comes from being hosted on a federal regulatory agency website.  What opportunity will  manufacturers have to comment on a report that one of their products may have triggered a fire in a home or caused a child to suffocate before the report is posted?  Unfortunately, not a whole lot!  The statute requires that within five days of receiving a report the Commission shall "to the extent practicable" transmit the report to the manufacturer identified in the report prior to the report being posted on the database.   Because the person making the report need not be identified to the manufacturer unless he or she explicitly consents, there may not be much the manufacturer can do, within the 10 day window provided before the report is posted, to determine whether the report is accurate. Certainly, this narrow window does not permit a manufacturer to obtain the product from a consumer, assuming the consumer can be identified, and inspect it.  The manufacturer can request that proprietary or trade secret information not be posted on the database, but that request, if granted, will result only in the sensitive information being redacted, not in a delay in posting the report on the database.  The statute permits a manufacturer to request that its own comments also be included in the database, but in the absence of a realistic time frame to perform an investigation of the underlying report, what would be an appropriate comment to make?  Moreover, the manufacturer may be at a disadvantage if reporters call seeking comment after the consumer's report is posted by the Commission. 

 On September 19, 2008, President Bush signed S. 2450 into law and new Evidence Rule 502  was added to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The new rule provides for protections against waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. The practical effect of the new legislation should be to reduce the often staggering legal costs corporations often incur in complex litigation, particularly in producing electronic discovery.  In drafting the legislation, the Advisory Committee of Evidence Rules recognized that lawyers spend significant time and effort preserving the attorney-client privilege and work product.  Under the prior rule, if a protected document was produced, even accidentally, there was a risk that a court would find a subject matter waiver that would apply, not only to the instant case and document, but to other cases and documents as well.  Thus, lawyers placed an enormous amount of effort (and expense) into pre-disclosure document review to protect against inadvertent disclosure.  Although waiver issues always have been a concern in document-intensive litigation (and will no doubt continue to be in the future), the increased discovery burden created by e-discovery brought this issue to the boiling point over the past two years.  Under the new rule, the jeopardy to corporations (and their law firms for permitting a waiver) is substantially mitigated.

The new rule does not address the scope of the attorney-client privilege or work product protection.  Rather, the new rule covers issues of scope of waiver, inadvertent disclosure, and the controlling effect of court orders and agreements.