Toxic Tort Litigation Blog : Toxic Tort Lawyer & Attorney : Epstein Becker Green Law Firm : Product Liability, Contamination, Pollution

On January 28, 2010, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the New Orleans  trial court’s denial of class certification in a series of putative class actions involving alleged exposure to Normally Occurring Radioactive Material (“NORM”) on industrial property located in , Louisiana, which had been used for oilfield pipe and equipment cleaning operations for over forty years. Although class certification was rejected on multiple grounds, the decision relied in large part upon the Louisiana Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Ford v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 703 S.2d 542, which involved alleged exposures from hazardous materials from several distinct sources. As in Ford, the class action failed because the Harvey plaintiffs alleged toxic exposures as a result of pipe cleaning activity on the non-contiguous property of three separate and distinct landowners – Rathborne, Grefer and ITCO – over a forty-six year period, with varying amounts of pipe cleaning taking place at different times in different locations (in almost checkerboard pattern) by different companies. Ford stands for the proposition that only mass torts arising from a single common cause or disaster are appropriate for class certification.

How did pipe cleaning cause the alleged NORM exposure? Pipe cleaning involves the mechanical reaming of the inside of oilfield pipe to remove scale or crust that builds up on the interior of the tubing to the point where the scale impedes the flow of oil up the pipe. The scale, formed from natural elements, gradually clogs the pipes that are inserted deep into the ground during the course of petroleum production. At some point, it was determined that the scale inside the pipe contained material determined to be radioactive, with varying half-lives (time for half of the atoms of a radioactive substance to decay), which is called “NORM” or “TERM,” an acronym referring to Technologically Enhanced Radioactive Material. When precisely the oil industry knew or should have known that pipe cleaning could result in occupational exposure to NORM is hotly disputed. The plaintiffs allege that over the decades this pipe cleaning occurred in Harvey, “toxic dust” (NORM/TERM) was deposited in their neighborhoods and was the source of various diseases and illnesses.

What I find interesting about the Fourth Circuit’s opinion is its rejection of the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement of the Louisiana Class Action Statute, which was a primary basis for the trial court’s denial of class certification. The trial court  found that there was not sufficient numerosity because so many potential class members had already opted out, citing other lawsuits in which 3,748 individuals, a large percentage of the putative class, were involved. These so-called opt-outs were represented by several outspoken plaintiff lawyers, who did not want to see a class certified. The Fourth Circuit ruled that it was premature to opt out of a class before it was certified. A plaintiff could not opt out of a class that did not yet exist. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that the numerosity requirement had been met. However,  the Fourth Circuit held that sufficient commonality for class certification was not present. In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that the broad diversity of the diseases and ailments of the plaintiffs underscored the inadequacy of the class representatives representation, leading the court to conclude that there was no typicality. The Harvey TERM plaintiffs complained of diseases ranging from common cold symptoms to reproductive problems and many different forms of cancer.  The plaintiffs' strategy at both the trial court and appellate level was to argue that the court should not be required to conduct a rigorous analysis of whether the facts satisfied the class action requirements.  Plaintiffs argued that the trial court confused a motion to certify a class with a trial on the merits, essentially asserting that it had made too many "factual findings".  However, the Fourth Circuit soundly rejected this argument, citing the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision inBrooks v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2008-2035, *6, 2009 WL 1425972 (La. 05/22/09), which recognized the "essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the district court's inherent power to manage and control pending litigation."  Brooks, 08-2035 at p. 11, 13 So 3d at 554

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

On February 26, 2010, the New York League of Conservation Voters (“NYLCV”) hosted an Eco-Partners Breakfast with New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) Commissioner Cas Holloway, DEP's energetic new commissioner.  Mayor Bloomberg appointed Mr. Holloway to head DEP in November 2009 after a year long nation-wide search. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Holloway served as a Senior Advisor and Chief of Staff to Ed Skyler, New York's Deputy Mayor for Operations. Mr. Holloway, a former Cravath associate who earned an undergraduate degree at Harvard and a law degree from the University of Chicago, brings to the position a rare combination of political savvy and operational know how that should serve DEP well.  Although DEP has a $1,000,000 budget and a staff of over six thousand, it often flies below the radar screen. DEP performs four basic functions. (1) First and foremost, it is a water utility. It is responsible for the supply, distribution and treatment of New York City’s drinking water. Unlike California, which delegates the supply and treatment functions to different agencies, both functions fall within DEP's  aegis in New York; (2) DEP is a customer service agency. It more or less determines the price of water; (3) DEP is a capital projects agency. For example, it is building at a cost of $6,000,000,000 the third underground tunnel that will carry drinking water from upstate to millions of New Yorkers; and (4) DEP is an environmental regulator on, among other things, air and water issues.   Based upon his first few months on the job, Cas Holloway appreciates the importance of working with various stakeholders and interest groups. On February 25, 2010, Mayor Bloomberg, Mr. Holloway's agency,  NYS Department of Environmental Conservation and several environmental groups announced an agreement-in-principle to significantly improve the health of Jamaica Bay through sewage treatment plant upgrades and investments in marsh restoration. As a result of the agreement-in-principle, DEP headed off a potentially costly Clean Water Act litigation arising from the alleged failure of its four sewage treatment plants to prevent nitrogen discharges to the bay. Mr. Holloway described the resolution of the Jamaica Bay dispute as a "paradigm shift" and a case study for how he hopes DEP will resolve future disputes. Up next for Mr. Holloway is the threat to water quality in the New York City Watershed posed by natural gas companies  seeking permits to exploit valuable natural gas deposits in the Marcellus Shale through the extensive use horizontal drilling and hydrofracking.  All New Yorkers should wish Mr. Holloway well in addressing this new Watershed concern.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

According to recent reports in the Greenwich Time, Greenwich, CT state legislators are proposing a bill that would prohibit building cell towers within 750 feet of a school or day care because of a perceived health risk from electromagnetic radiation. However, some Cos Cob, CT residents believe that the cell towers should not be permitted within 5,000 feet of any schools, day cares and elderly homes due to health concerns. Reportedly, the cell tower bill has been proposed by Rep. Fred Camillo, R-151st District, and supported by fellow Reps. Livvy Floren, R-149th District, Lile Gibbons, R-250th District, and Sen. L. Scott Frantz, R-136th District. There is no good evidence that attending school near a cell tower, such as the one proposed, creates a health risk. During the 1980’s, some plaintiff lawyers ballyhooed electromagnetic field (“EMF”) litigation as the “new asbestos.” A series of well-funded EMF trials were litigated against various electric utility companies around the United States in the 1990’s. After the presentation of the scientific evidence, judges and juries uniformly rejected plaintiff health claims. The Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) website contains a great deal of reliable scientific information concerning health effects from radiation exposure from cell towers, cell phones, microwave ovens and hair dryers. According to the CDC, the risk is extremely low. The low frequency radiation that those fields emit may have a biological effect, but do not cause adverse health effects, according to the website of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), which has devoted years of study on EMFs. So what is a biological effect? WHO’s literature explains that “biological effects” may include “listening to music, reading a book, eating an apple or playing tennis,” none of which cause health effects. WHO's conclusion is that there is no health risk to the EMF radiation to which the public is exposed. Thus, contrary to popular hysteria, there is no evidence that proximity to EMFs can “fry” a person’s brain or cause cancer. If our legislators are going to propose EMF safety precautions, they should base their proposals on strong science rather than fear. The "dose" or exposure from cell tower EMFs can be measured and quantified. Once that “exposure” is known, it is then necessary to look to the scientific literature to evaluate the likelihood of a health risk from that exposure. If EMF radiation posed a health risk to everyone living near a cell tower, it is a no-brainer that all cell towers should be dismantled--not just those near schools and day cares and homes for the elderly. The cell tower issue has always been about diminution of property value and aesthetics; it is not about our health! 
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (5)
• Trackbacks

According to a report issued by Cornell Law School, the State of New York’s blueprint for Marcellus Shale development proposes 187 new regulatory activities necessary for the oversight of natural gas drilling, but the blueprint does not explain how DEC will carry out these activities.  Cornell’s report concludes that DEC does not have the manpower to appropriately regulate economic development in the Marcellus Shale Formation. According to Adjunct Professor Keith Porter at Cornell Law School, “There is no way they [DEC’s Division of Mineral Resources] have enough people to visit the sites to make sure conditions are met.”  The Cornell study notes that DEC’s proposals require firsthand inspections and the development of detailed spill prevention plans on a site-by-site basis. The proposals also involve assessing and monitoring water resources to ensure they are not damaged by the gas industry’s need for huge volumes of fresh water to stimulate gas production in the fracking process. This process involves shooting millions of gallons of chemical solutions into each well, which then regurgitate brine and wastewater with chemicals, heavy metals and naturally occurring radioactivity. For their part, industry proponents point to New York’s strict regulations and a strong track record by industry. Environmental advocates challenge industry claims, pointing to hundreds of incidents and complaints involving natural gas and oil drilling buried in the DEC’s hazardous spills database. However,  it was reported on January 11, 1010 that DEC Commissioner Pete Grannis had asserted in a letter to Assemblyman William Parment, a member of the legislature's Environmental Conservation Committee, that reports of accidents relating to natural gas drilling in New York have been overblown and taken out of context.  Without additional DEC inspectors, says Professor Porter, Marcellus Development “will rely on self-compliance.” Environmental advocates point to the water contamination and regulatory violations that plagued the operations of Cabot Oil & Gas in Dimock, Pennsylvania as an object lesson. The Cornell study summarizes the proposed regulatory obligations DEC sets forth in the draft Supplemental Generic which include, among other things,  protecting water resources such as New York’s portion of the Great Lakes Basin;  reviewing permits for equipment and structures that might disturb surface water bodies such as rivers and streams or potentially impact aquatic wetland and terrestrial habitats and water quality;  impacts to wetlands; aquifer depletion arising from proposed groundwater withdrawals for high-volume hydraulic fracturing; reviewing major water withdrawals and approved diversions in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin under the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Water Resources Compact; comprehensive storm water pollution prevention plans and review of permits to address storm water runoff and storm water discharges; industrial activities, including addressing potential sources of pollution and determining when drilling and hydraulic fracturing operations are completed; surface spills and releases at the Well Pad; drilling rig, fuel and tank refueling activities; groundwater impacts associated with well drilling and construction;  private water well testing;  infrastructure control from waste transport to road spreading; and, not least, protecting New York City’s subsurface water supply infrastructure. The import  of the Cornell Law School study is that New York can build an elaborate regulatory scheme designed to protect the environment, but unless there are enough of the right people to enforce the regulations and ensure that they are being rigorously adhered to, the regulations do not amount to much. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

Environmental groups and proponents of economic development and natural gas exploration are on a collision course of competing economic and environmental interests involving an enormous untapped reservoir of natural gas in the Marcellus Shale Formation. That the Marcellus Shale Formation lies in part across economically depressed regions in upstate New York and Pennsylvania, in urgent need of  an economic boost,  only adds fuel to the dispute. At the heart of the controversy lies the New York City watershed, pristine waters in upstate New York  counties that provide the drinking water for millions of people in New York City. The Marcellus Shale Formation sits underground and stretches southwest from New York through Pennsylvania, and into West Virginia and Ohio. According to experts at Penn State University, the Marcellus Shale Formation is the largest known shale deposit in the world. Recently developed extraction techniques in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are expected to provide an additional boost to the productivity of Marcellus gas wells. Terry Englander, a geoscience professor at Penn State University, estimates that recoverable reserves in Marcellus Shale could be as high as 489 trillion cubic feet! The Draft 2009 New York State Energy Plan recognizes the great potential benefit to New York from development of the Marcellus Shale natural gas resource. But what environmental safeguards should accompany this monumental enterprise?

On December 23, 2009, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) (not to be confused with theNew York State Department of Environmental Conservation or "DEC"),  called for a prohibition on natural gas drilling in the New York City watershed, urging that, “[N]natural gas drilling and exploration are incompatible with the operation of New York State’s unfiltered water supply system and pose unacceptable risks for more than nine million New Yorkers in this City and State.” According to DEP’s Final Impact Assessment Report, drilling in the watershed requires invasive industrialization and would create a substantial risk of chemical contamination and infrastructure damage. In particular, the DEP’s report singled out the high-volume hydrofracking and horizontal drilling as posing significant environmental risks. Clearly, measures will be taken to protect the watershed, but the devil will be in the details.  A Congressional Research Service report, released on September 9, 2009, examines gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale region.  The report acknowledges that groundwater contamination from improper drilling and casing is a risk.  Water sources in New York listed as "primary" or "principal" aquifers may be at risk, according to the report, due to the permeable "unconsolidated sand and gravel deposits" in northern Pennsylvania and southern New York because of short distances from the land surface to the water table. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

The Mass Tort Defense Blog reported recently that the North Carolina federal district court overseeing the MDL concerning panacryl sutures declined last week to certify a proposed national class action in In re Panacryl Sutures Products Liability Cases, 2009 WL 3874347 (E.D.N.C. 11/13/09).  The decision is a significant one for pharmaceutical and medical device MDL practitioners because the court's reasoning in denying class certification is broadly applicable to other medical device products. It is increasingly rare for plaintiffs to obtain class certification in medical device litigation and this case is no exception. Panacryl Sutures are synthetic, braided, absorbable surgical sutures, designed to remain in a patient's body for 24-36 months after surgery to provide wound support. Various plaintiffs alleged that Panacryl Sutures were defective in that they allegedly caused a high rate of foreign body reactions when used as directed. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate warning of the dangers associated with the devices. Plaintiffs eventually filed a motion to certify a National Class Action. The Panacryl sutures were the subject of a  2006 recall by FDA.

In his blog post, Dechert's Sean P Wajert, discusses the various rationale underlying the court's decision not to certify a national class. In evaluating the requirements under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), the court considered the impact that the laws of the various states where plaintiffs reside would have on the proposed class.  Considering Rule 23(a)(3)'s "typicality" requirement, the court found that the plaintiffs had not considered the varying substantive laws governing every class member.  Considering to Rule 23(b), the court found that in class actions governed by the laws of several states, variations in state law often overwhelmed common issues.  The court held that the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate by "extensive analysis" that the laws of interested jurisdictions did not pose "insuperable obstacles" to class certification.  As Mr. Wajert points out, courts have generally found that common questions of fact do not predominate in medical device products cases. In the Panacryl Sutures litigation, the sutures were used in a variety of surgical procedures, which required different techniques and skill sets on the part of the surgeon and presented different risks of post-operative complications.  Thus, it is not likely that any class would have been certified due to a lack of predominance of common issues, let alone a national class. For a further discussion of the policy and legal considerations that warrant denial of class actions in pharmaceutical and medical device litigation, take a look at the enthusiastic discussion of the decision in the Drug and Device Law Blog authored by Jim Beck and Dechert and Mark Herrmann at Jones Day.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

In a first-of-its-kind litigation, the Ecological Rights Foundation ("ERF") has alleged in a Complaint brought in federal district court in San Francisco that Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E)  is  in violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").  ERF alleges that the treatment of PG&E's utility poles treated with pentachlorophenol ("penta"), a wood preservative, has resulted in contamination of groundwater and surface water throughout four counties in Northern California -- Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Francisco, including San Francisco Bay.  The suit implicates all of the estimated 300,000 utility poles that support Northern California's electrical power grid. Does ERF expect a court will order that all of those utility poles be taken down and replaced with poles comprised of an as-yet-to-be-invented-space-age-material that does not require chemical treatment, never deteriorates, causes no environmental harm and does not cause hazardous waste to be emitted during manufacture? 

In an article posted on its website, Foley & Lardner, which has been tapped by PG&E, cautions that  this lawsuit potentially has far-reaching implications. The Milwaukee-based law firm notes that millions of utility poles throughout the country are treated with penta or other preservatives, which are necessary to keep the utility poles from deteriorating and to keep electricity and telephone service flowing to homes and businesses.  Significantly, they observe that the environmental impact of the penta-treated poles was examined in great detail by the USEPA when the use of penta-treated wood poles as utility poles was approved.  By approving the use of penta, USEPA found that penta did not cause the significant environmental harm now alleged by ERF. If ERF is successful in San Francisco, where might this type of litigation lead? 

Apart from the serious policy considerations at issue here, ERF's lawsuit will have to overcome significant legal hurdles, including for starters: (1) that under CWA, ERF must demonstrate that each individual pole is a "point source". It may be difficult to argue with a straight face in federal court that PG&E should have obtained a permit for each discharge from every pole--all separate violations of the statute: and (2) that under RCRA, ERF must demonstrate that PG&E is a generator of solid waste that presents "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. The defendants are not the applicators of the material.  The sub-text of the litigation appears to revolve around  ERF's unhappiness over USEPA's past decision making concerning the use of Penta on utility poles. If so, ERF take it up with USEPA and leave our fragile power grid alone! 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (2)
• Trackbacks

Kenneth Ross, one of the more discerning authors in the product liability defense bar, has authored a thoughtful piece titled, Is There Anything Optional About Safety? in the August '09 DRI Product Liability Committee Newsletter--"Strictly Speaking".  As manufacturers design new products and update the design of old products, many times they sell and offer for sale differing levels of safety and quality.  Ken's article explores the legal and practical risks in selling products with these differences and provides advice to manufacturers about minimizing risk.  As one law professor notes, the case law is "muddled and quite sparse".  There are cases on both sides--those that hold that safety devices can be optional and those that hold that not installing a safety device establishes a basis for liability.  Ken discusses several important considerations that should be weighed in performing this delicate balancing act.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

BNA Toxics Law Reporter reports that on August 3, 2009, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the American Chemistry Council ("ACC"), formerly known as the Chemical Manufacturers Association, in a case arising from a plaintiff's long-term exposure to vinyl chloride. The First Circuit's decision in June Taylor et al v. ACC, et al is attached. The ACC is the chemical industry's trade association.  The ACC has been effective in improving the image of the chemical industry in the United States and in promoting safety and environmental initiatives within its membership.  The family of Claude Taylor alleged in federal district court in Massachusetts that ACC, along with several chemical manufacturers, should be found liable for failure to warn, conspiracy and fraud for helping to produce false and misleading warnings that were adopted by the PVC industry.  The plaintiff focused on an ACC publication entitled, "Chemical Safety Data Sheet SD-56", which was first published in 1954 and later revised in 1972, claiming that the publication downplayed the danger of VC exposure.  In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the ACC, the First Circuit held that there was no evidence that the trade association had the "unlawful intent" necessary to establish "substantial assistance liability" under MA law.  The court held that it would have been necessary for plaintiff to prove that ACC was aware of Monsanto's tortious conduct and that it intended to assist or encourage that conduct.  The wide dissemination of SD-56 within the industry was not sufficient to support the claim that the ACC was aware that Monsanto was incorporating SD-56 into its own literature.  ACC's lawyer, Tim Couglin of Thompson Hine, successfully convinced the appeals court that: (1) ACC did not provide "substantial assistance" to Monsanto; (2) ACC had no knowledge of Monsanto's activities; and (3) there was no record evidence to support the underlying conspiracy claim. 

Trade associations do not manufacture or market products, but they have been the targets of toxic tort and product liability plaintiffs nonetheless.  The threshold issue in these cases is whether the association owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.  In cases in which the trade association is alleged to have promulgated a safety standard, the issue often comes down to the degree of control the trade association has over its members.  In the absence of control, the trade association is not as likely to be held liable for failure to warn.  What about a trade association that endorses products?  If a plaintiff's injury is due to a defect in a product bearing the "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval", for example, is the association potentially liable?  One California court replied in the affirmative if it could be demonstrated that the association obtained economic gain from the endorsement and encouraged the public to purchase the product, and that  the plaintiff relied on the representation to his detriment.  Courts appear to recognize that it is not in the public interest to hold trade associations liable for injuries to remote plaintiffs in tort litigation.  The AAA might rank hotels on the basis of service and cleanliness.  Should the AAA be subject to liability for injuries allegedly resulting from its failing to warn its members that a hotel was located in a bad neighborhood?

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

According to Senator Herb Kohl, the intention of the "Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009" (S. 537) is to require federal judges to perform a " simple balancing test" to ensure that in any proposed secrecy order, the defendant's interest in secrecy truly outweighs the public interest in information related to public health and safety.  Citing court-approved confidential settlement agreements in product liability cases entered into by drug and tire manufacturers, Senator Kohl argues that federal judges must be required to consider public health and safety when deciding whether to allow a secrecy order.   Although this proposal may have a populist appeal, the  American Bar Association believes that the proposed law would make discovery more burdensome, more expensive, and more time-consuming, and would threaten important privacy interests.  The Act would change Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) by limiting a court's ability to enter an order in a civil case: (1) restricting disclosure of information obtained through discovery; (2) approving a settlement agreement restricting the disclosure of such information; or (3) restricting access to court records in civil cases. Before entering a secrecy order, a court would first have to perform the balancing test discussed by Senator Kohl or reach a determination that the order would not restrict the disclosure of information relevant to the protection of public health or safety.  I concur with the ABA that the Sunshine Act is a bad idea; its adoption would not serve the public interest.

The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States reported last year that empirical studies demonstrate that there is no evidence that protective orders create a significant problem of concealing information about public hazards.  The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules strongly opposes the measure as unnecessary legislation that will burden the courts and have significant adverse consequences for civil litigation.  Moreover, the ABA already has adopted policy that encourages courts to permit disclosure of information relevant to potential hazards.  Typically, in cases involving a sealed settlement agreement, there is sufficient information available to the public providing details of a potential public health or safety hazard. As product liability litigators are well aware, protective orders serve to facilitate the timely production of documents. Requiring that a court hearing be conducted before such an order is entered into in every civil case would consume precious judicial resources and further delay litigants' day in court.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

My hometown newspaper Greenwich Time, reported in a front page headline on March 25, 2009 "Mold found again at Ham Ave."  The Hamilton Avenue Elementary School in Greenwich was closed in 2005 largely due to the perception that mold made the school unsafe for students and faculty.  For the past three years, the youngsters attended classes in temporary modular classrooms, which ironically also suffered from mold problems, while awaiting completion of the oft-delayed reconstruction of the school, the Greenwich Time reported.   It was discovered last week at the newly re-opened school that a 2-to-3-square-foot patch of mold was discovered due to a leaky interior pipe that hadn't been properly sealed during construction. It is not surprising that the school's industrial hygienist, Hygenix, found "exceptionally low" levels of mold after sampling. What is surprising is that the decision was made to perform sampling at all considering that the source of the water infiltration was addressed and the mold removed.  Sampling is often not necessary and sampling results are frequently misinterpreted to suggest a health hazard where none exists.  In its guidance for "Mold Remediation in Schools and Contaminated Buildings", the USEPA cautions that there a number of pitfalls associated with mold sampling which at best only provides a "snapshot" of conditions as they exist at a given time.  To suggest, as the school's consultant did, however, that any "residual microbial hazards" had been eliminated is an unfortunate choice of words because it is probably the case that no hazard ever existed in the first place.  Ron Gots, a toxicologist based in Rockville, Maryland, who has written extensively about public misinformation about mold describes how medical statements by mold testers may result in unintended consequences in the event of a claim.  For example, the statement in a hygienist's report that "This mold is known to produce toxins which can cause a variety of adverse health effects including......"  is not only irrelevant, but begs the question whether:(1) the mold is producing toxins in this instance?; (2) those toxins are getting to people?; and (3)  they are getting to people in sufficient quantity to cause harm?  As Dr. Gots points out, the issue is not what molds can do; the question is what they are likely or proven to do under these particular circumstances in this setting.  To avoid further fear and confusion about mold (and unnecessary costs) at the Hamilton Avenue school,  a more scientifically objective approach should be considered by the Town. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks

In his  recent article, "Made in China: Consumer Product Lawsuits Imported to the United States", Seattle defense lawyer and IADC member Gregory Shelton offers American importers several good suggestions for avoiding potential liability from imported products.  These include: (1) requiring the exporter to comply with all applicable U.S. product quality standards and product safety regulations; (2) obtaining legal counsel in the exporter's home jurisdiction; (3) requiring the exporter to obtain appropriate insurance coverage from an American or international insurer that will protect the importer in the event of a recall or lawsuit; and (4) retaining good legal counsel early.  I would add to Greg's checklist: (5) having an independent U.S. consultant available to test, if necessary, the components of imported products, particularly if an American consumer reports a complaint to the company or to the CPSC.  Early independent product evaluation can be critical for an importer in planning its next steps, such as whether to perform a recall or halt future shipments until an issue can be addressed.  There are many good consultant firms to chose from. One excellent consultant up-to-speed on the new CPSC requirements is Exponent.

However, we disagree with Mr. Shelton when he argues that Chinese imports are more likely to result in lawsuits or recalls than imports from other countries.  There is simply no empirical evidence to support this assertion.  To the contrary, China has made enormous progress, particularly over the last year, to police its domestic suppliers.  To blame China for the spate of recalls over the last couple of years is to ignore the past lack of adequate funding for the CPSC, the agency that provides regulatory oversight of consumer products.  Moreover, blaming China results in Americans turning a blind eye to problems in our domestic product supply chain. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

In a provocative thought piece appearing in the Wall Street Journal on March 9, 2009, L. Gordon Crovitz predicts that the United States Supreme Court decision in Wyeth v. Levine will usher in an era of increased prices for drug and create a disincentive for new product innovation. Mr. Crovitz compares the American legal culture behind the Court's decision to the Luddites that smashed mechanized looms in England at the beginning of the Industrial Age in 19th century England.  He also suggests that the decision's logic may lead product manufacturers to "carry 50 different warnings, one for each state, updated by local juries from time to time."  Despite his misgivings about the decision, it is not likely that any product manufacturers, drug makers or otherwise, are likely to start tailoring their warning on a state by state basis.  As a practical matter, products are sold nationally, often through distributors, and it would be virtually impossible to  ensure that product warnings for Texas purchasers ended up in Texas and that product warnings intended for California purchasers ended up in California.  Moreover, from a jury standpoint, nothing would please a plaintiff's lawyer more than to be able to argue that the manufacturer provided a less strict warning for the product in the jurisdiction where his client's accident occurred. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks

How can a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer owe a duty to patients who take only a generic version of its product? In a case of first impression in California, a state appellate court held on November 7, 2008 that Wyeth, Inc. owed a duty to plaintiff Elizabeth Conte, who developed a serious and irreversible neurological condition as a result of taking metoclopramide, the generic version of Wyeth’s Reglan, which is used to treat gastroesophageal reflux disease. In so holding, the California appellate court declined to follow the holdings of a majority of courts that have grappled with this issue.

In Elizabeth Ann Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. et al., the Court of Appeal of the State of the California in the First Appellate District in San Francisco, held that a brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturer’s common law duty to use due care when providing product warnings extends not only to consumers of its own product, but also to those patients whose doctors foreseeably rely on the name-brand manufacturer’s product information in prescribing a medication, even if the prescription is filled with the generic version of the drug. In reversing summary judgment granted to Wyeth by the trial court, the appellate court accepted Conte’s argument that Wyeth should be liable for her injuries because a brand-name manufacturer that disseminates information about its product owes a duty of care to ensure the information’s accuracy to all physicians who prescribe the drug in reasonable reliance on that information, even if the patient ends up taking the product’s generic equivalent.

The court agreed with Wyeth that Conte could not pursue a strict products liability claim against Wyeth. Indeed, Conte did not allege that Wyeth was strictly liability due to inadequate warnings. Rather, she claimed that Wyeth failed to exercise due care in disseminating its product information to physicians.  The court rejected Wyeth’s contention that Conte’s case was merely a product liability suit masquerading as a negligence case. The court held that the plaintiff could pursue claims of intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation based upon Wyeth’s labeling information about the safety of metoclopramide, the risks of its long term use, and the likelihood of serious side effects. 

Was the court correct in determining that Wyeth owed the plaintiff a duty in a negligence context where no such duty could be found to exist in a strict liability case? As a matter of public policy, should a brand-name drug manufacturer be subjected to what Wyeth argued might be “permanent and uncontrolled liability” in perpetuity. Even as a brand-name manufacturer’s sales decrease over time, its potential product liability exposure may actually increase because of higher market share won by generic competitors. Ironically, the generic manufacturer takes precious market share from the brand-name manufacturer at the same time that the court shifts the generic’s product liability exposure back to the pioneer. 

We believe that the better reasoned analysis of this issue may be found in Foster v. American Home Products Corp. (4th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d. 165 (2003), in which the Fourth Circuit held that a manufacturer of a name-brand drug could not be held liable under a theory of negligent representation for an injury arising from the ingestion of a generic version of the drug. Taken to its logical extreme, in the brave new world envisioned by the Conte court, it may not matter that a plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer of a product that caused an alleged injury so long as the plaintiff can plausibly claim to have relied on some other manufacturer’s operator’s manual.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks

The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 ("CPSIA") provides that the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC") will establish and maintain an Internet database on the safety of consumer products.  The CPSIA Section 212 requires that the database be: (1) available to the public; (2)  searchable; and (3) accessible on the CPSC's website.  Reports of harm caused by consumer products may be reported by consumers; local, state or federal govenment agencies; health care professionals; child service providers; and public safety entities. Ideally, the database will encourage the sharing of information and direct communications among consumers, consumer advocacy groups and state attorneys general, who have been given an important new role under the CPSIA.  For the first time, consumers will have direct instant access on the Agency's website to potentially important product safety information. 

The CPSIA of 2008 is much needed legislation to upgrade the level of  protection provided to the American consumer by the federal government.  The law represents the Congress' response to a year of multiple, embarrassing consumer product scandal after another during what some commentators have termed the "Year of the Recall".  In the past, information vital to the public welfare concerning defective consumer products has not been promptly provided to the American people.  At times, this delay may have been responsible for what may have been preventable injuries or deaths --  hence, the legislative mandate for the database.   

In light of these public benefits, can there be any dark side to this new era of governmental transparency?  Are consumer product companies justified in fearing that the database has the potential to  spread disinformation and unfairly tarnish reputations? 

The statute requires that a report submitted for inclusion on the database: (1) describe the consumer product; (2) identify the manufacturer or private labeler; (3) describe the harm related to the use of the product; (4) provide contact information; and (5) contain a verification that the report is true and accurate. Based upon informal Commission staffer comments, the CPSC is not required to perform an independent investigation to determine the veracity of a report or whether the incident that is the subject of the report occurred in the manner claimed or occurred at all.  For this reason, there is a risk that the database may morph into a  consumer Wikipedia, but with the imprimatur of United States approval and the gloss that comes from being hosted on a federal regulatory agency website.  What opportunity will  manufacturers have to comment on a report that one of their products may have triggered a fire in a home or caused a child to suffocate before the report is posted?  Unfortunately, not a whole lot!  The statute requires that within five days of receiving a report the Commission shall "to the extent practicable" transmit the report to the manufacturer identified in the report prior to the report being posted on the database.   Because the person making the report need not be identified to the manufacturer unless he or she explicitly consents, there may not be much the manufacturer can do, within the 10 day window provided before the report is posted, to determine whether the report is accurate. Certainly, this narrow window does not permit a manufacturer to obtain the product from a consumer, assuming the consumer can be identified, and inspect it.  The manufacturer can request that proprietary or trade secret information not be posted on the database, but that request, if granted, will result only in the sensitive information being redacted, not in a delay in posting the report on the database.  The statute permits a manufacturer to request that its own comments also be included in the database, but in the absence of a realistic time frame to perform an investigation of the underlying report, what would be an appropriate comment to make?  Moreover, the manufacturer may be at a disadvantage if reporters call seeking comment after the consumer's report is posted by the Commission. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks

Whether electricity supplied to a homeowner by the local electric utility  is viewed as a "product" or a "service" may have significant ramifications in litigation.  If providing electricity constitutes a "product", injured plaintiffs can seek recovery under a theory of strict liability.  If it is not a product, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate the electric utility failed to use reasonable care.  In a recent Connecticut case, Travelers Indemnity Company of America v. Connecticut Light & Power Co, Hartford J.D. at Harford (Docket No. CV-07-5012441-S ) 2008 WL 2447351 (Conn. Super.), the trial court  held that once electricity entered the homeowner's residence, it constituted a "product" rather than a "service" and that plaintiff could  proceed under the Connecticut Product Liability Act ("CPLA").   In the case, a fire allegedly caused by voltage fluctuations broke out in the home of Travelers' insureds, Linda and Michael Murphy, resulting in property damage.  Apparently,  the Murphy's had complained to CL&P earlier about the voltage fluctuations and had been assured that the problem had been addressed.  After paying the claim,

Connecticut courts are split concerning whether electricity can be classified as a product such that a claim could be brought under the CPLA..  However, the court in Travelers relied upon what appears to be an emerging majority view nationally.  In a 1985 California appellate decision, Pierce v. PG&E, the court opined that policy justifications warranted the imposition of strict liability: (1)  difficulty of proving negligence involving a vast and complex electrical power system; (2) economic incentive for improved product safety; (3) to encourage reallocation of resources toward safer products; and (4) to spread the risk of loss among all who use the product.  What judicial limitations may be reasonable to prevent increased access to strict liability in tort for toxic tort plaintiffs injured by electricity? One bright line test might be permit electricity to be viewed as a product only when the electricity has been transferred to the consumer in a usable voltage.  Only then could a court reasonably view electricity as a consumer product.  Under this test, exposure to high voltage transmission lines would not result in a strict liability lawsuit. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (3)
• Trackbacks (1)